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BITTLE V. BAHE: A DRUNKEN MISTAKE
Brian Alan Burget*

I. Introduction
Throughout the past two decades, the United States has seen Indian tribes
become a major driving force in the nation's economy. Recent years have
been marked by tribes aggressively creating new businesses in the areas of real
estate, banking and finance, media and telecommunications, wholesale and
retail trade, tourism, and most predominantly, gaming.' Today the gaming
industry has exploded into a multi-billion-dollar business.2 In 2002 alone,
Indian tribes generated $14.8 billion in revenue from more than 330 gaming
facilities in twenty-eight different states.3 Thus it is clear that no other tribal
venture has been more extensive and significant than tribal gaming. Although
tribal gaming growth has certainly led to better self-sufficiency amongst tribes,
it has arguably created a number of negative consequences.
Unsurprisingly, tribal growth has sparked legal conflict between tribal and
non-tribal members. The gaming explosion alone has spawned a significant
amount of litigation and regulatory controversy. State courts are now
consistently faced with perhaps one of the most complex and ambiguous
conflicts in American jurisprudence-the conflict between state and tribal
jurisdiction. Yet the jurisdictional conflict between states and tribes is not a
new phenomenon.
Disputes over federal, state, and tribal powers have plagued American
courts since their creation. "From the first days of the Continental Congress
and throughout the struggle for independence, the American government
sought to address the causes for Indian resentment and centralize Indian
affairs." To address these concerns, the Continental Congress determined that
"'securing and preserving the friendship of the Indian Nations, appear[ed] to
be a subject of the utmost moment to these colonies,' and appointed northern,
southern, and middle departments of Indian affairs to 'treat with the

* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 1279-80 (Nell Jessup Newton et al.
eds., Michie 2005) [hereinafter COHEN].
2. Id. at 858 (citing NAT'L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM'N, FINAL REPORT 6-1

(1999)).
3. Id. (citing NAT'L INDIAN GAMING COMM'N, TRIBAL DATA (2003)).
4. Id. at 20.
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Indians ... to preserve peace and friendship."' 5 Subsequently, Chief Justice
John Marshall observed in 1831 that "[t]he condition of the Indians in relation
to the United States is perhaps unlike that of any other two people in
existence ... [it is] marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist
no where else."'
Marshall ultimately introduced the idea that tribes are "distinct, independent
political communities"-entities "qualified to exercise powers of selfgovernment, not by virtue of any delegation of powers, but rather by reason
of their original tribal sovereignty."' At its core, Marshall's recognition of
tribal sovereignty acknowledged inherent tribal power free from state
authority. In short, Marshall recognized a tribe's common-law immunity from
suit against all but the federal government. Marshall's decision effectively
granted tribes the right to govern themselves as sovereign nations, thereby
limiting the right of the states to exert power over them.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity has since evolved and has now received
outward recognition by the Supreme Court, as well as many other courts
across the United States.' Despite the fact that tribal sovereignty and tribal
immunity are well-accepted legal precedents, their parameters continue to be
tested in state courts. One example of such a challenge arose before the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma in the case of Bittle v. Bahe. o
The dispute in Bittle arose out of an automobile accident occurring on April
30, 2004. Shatona Bittle was driving westbound on Oklahoma Highway 9
when a motor vehicle driven in the eastbound lane crossed the center line and
collided with her head-on." The driver of the vehicle, Bahe, was alleged to
have visited the Thunderbird Casino, a casino owned and operated by the
Absentee Shawnee Tribe of Oklahoma, prior to the collision. 12 As a result of
the collision, Bittle filed suit in state district court contending that the
Absentee Shawnee Tribe and its casino illegally served Bahe while he was

5. Id. (citing 2 J. CONTINENTAL CONG. 175, 183 (1775)).
6. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831).
7. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
8. COHEN, supra note 1, at 205 (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323-24
(1978)).
9. See Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751,756-57 (1998) (explaining that the
idea of tribal immunity was first mentioned in Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 358
(1919), although it was not made explicit until 1940 in UnitedStates v. UnitedStates Fidelity
& Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940)).
10. 192 P.3d 810 (Okla. 2008).
11. Id. at 813.
12. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol34/iss1/4

No. 1]

NOTES

125

obviously intoxicated and thus should have been held liable for all personal
injuries sustained by Bittle in the accident."
Oklahoma recognizes dram-shop liability 4 in an attempt "to place a hand
of restraint on those authorized to sell and serve intoxicating liquors."
Therefore, Oklahoma law gives "parties injured by an intoxicated person a
right of action against the persons who sold and served" the intoxicants.' 6 The
district court noted, however, that neither the Oklahoma Statutes nor the
common law provided an individual with a private cause of action against a
federally recognized Indian tribe." The district court further concluded that
suit against such a tribe is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.'" The
court found that the tribe had not waived sovereign immunity and therefore
could not be held liable."
On appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the lower court's
ruling, finding that the tribe could not be haled into state court for a private
cause of action under state dram-shop law.20 Further, the court of civil appeals
found that 18 U.S.C. § 116121 did not clearly and expressly authorize such a
suit against an Indian tribe for an alleged violation of a state's alcoholicbeverage laws.22 The court of civil appeals concluded that any tribal
agreement to comply with state alcoholic beverage laws through state liquor
licensing did not clearly and expressly waive tribal immunity and thus did not
give the State civil adjudicatory jurisdiction.
In an opinion written by Justice Steven Taylor, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court vacated the opinion of the court of civil appeals and reversed the district

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
37 OKLA. STAT. § 537 (Supp. 2007).
45 AM. JuR. 2D intoxicatingLiquors § 459 (2009).
Id.
Bittle, 192 P.3d at 813.
Id. at 813-14.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 814.
21. This section reads in full:
The provisions of 1154, 1156, 3113, 3488, and 3669, of this title, shall not apply
within any area that is not Indian country, nor to any act or transaction within any
area of Indian country provided such act or transaction is in conformity both with
the laws of the State in which such act or transaction occurs and with an ordinance
duly adopted by the tribe having jurisdiction over such area of Indian country,
certified by the Secretary of the Interior, and published in the Federal Register.

18 U.S.C. § 1161 (2006).
22. Bittle, 192 P.3d at 814.
23. Id.
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court's dismissal.24 The majority acknowledged that as a matter of federal law
an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized such suit
or where a tribe has expressly and clearly waived its immunity. 25 Following
the acknowledgment, the court nevertheless concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 1161
congressionally authorized the State of Oklahoma to adjudicate private-party
dram-shop claims against Indian tribes.2 6 The Oklahoma Supreme Court
reasoned that the language "laws of the state" found in § 1161 is
comprehensive and thus gives the State broad adjudicatory power over
alcohol-related disputes involving Indians. 27 The Oklahoma Supreme Court
looked to the U.S. Supreme Court case of Rice v. Rehner28 as authority to
support its decision. The Oklahoma Supreme Court ultimately expanded
Rehner to grant states civil adjudicatorypower, despite the fact that Rehner
only provided states with civil regulatorypower in tribal alcohol matters.29
The Oklahoma Supreme Court further reasoned that the Absentee Shawnee
Tribe waived sovereign immunity by applying for, and accepting, an
Oklahoma State Liquor License.30 In its opinion, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court held that such a license binds the holder to the Oklahoma Beverage
In a
Control Act, thereby allowing for the enforcement of that statute.
previous opinion the court had articulated that section 537(A)(2) extends the
right to an individual to pursue a private cause of action against a commercial
vendor who illegally furnishes alcohol to an obviously intoxicated person.32
Thus, the Absentee Shawnee Tribe could be held liable by the terms of the
Oklahoma State Liquor License.
In its decision, the Oklahoma Supreme Court failed critically to examine the
contours of tribal sovereign immunity. Further, the court failed to follow
roughly eighty years of legal precedent set before it. The court's decision to
hold the Absentee Shawnee Tribe liable under state dram-shop law does
nothing but alter the doctrine of tribal immunity to the court's liking.

24. Id.
25. Id. at 819-20.
26. Id. at 823.
27. Id.
28. 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
29. Bittle, 192 P.3d at 823.
30. Id. at 826.
31. Id. The terms of the Oklahoma Beverage Control Act prohibit a person from selling,
delivering, or knowingly furnishing alcohol to an intoxicated person. 37 OKLA. STAT. §
537(A)(2) (Supp. 2002).
32. Brigance v. Velvet Dove Rest., Inc., 725 P.2d 300, 304 (Okla. 1986).
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This note explores how the Oklahoma Supreme Court erred in Bittle v.
Bahe, raising implications beyond the narrow realm of tribal sovereign
immunity. Part II discusses tribal sovereign immunity as it has been
recognized within the United States court system and the importance of
upholding its boundaries. Parts III and IV explore the Oklahoma Supreme
Court's improper reliance on Rice v. Rehner and its finding that 18 U.S.C. §
1161 authorized the state's assertion of jurisdiction. Part V argues that the
Absentee Shawnee Tribe of Oklahoma did not clearly and expressly waive
sovereign immunity by applying for, and accepting, an Oklahoma State Liquor
License. Finally, Part VI discusses the potential impact of Bittle and explores
issues not discussed by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in providing the state
with implied jurisdiction.
II. TribalSovereignty
Sovereignty is a word with many interpretations, and it has often been used
loosely when discussed in the Indian context. In its most basic form, the term
refers to the inherent right or power to govern oneself free from external
forces. And although a tribal nation's "sovereignty does not depend on its
recognition from others, a [tribe]'s ability to exercise sovereign rights within
[a larger] arena may be directly affected by such recognition or lack of it."33
Today the United States recognizes the sovereignty of many tribal nations.34
This recognition, however, has been "tenuous and ever-shifting."" A host of
court opinions, treaties, and legislation all speak to the status of tribal nations
and the powers held by them. Contemporary understandings of sovereignty
often reference autonomy, independence, self-govemance, and freedom from
external interferences." Yet the meaning of sovereignty is not fixed. "Rather,
the arenas in which it is expressed shape its conceptions, definitions, and
applications." 3 7 Thus, history plays a vital role in the examination of
sovereignty and the immunity inherent in it.
When the United States was first settled by European colonists, tribes were
sovereign by nature. Tribes did not depend on any outside source of power to
legitimize their actions, nor did they rely on any external government's aid in
conducting their own affairs. "The forms of political order included multi33. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLCY AND LAW 725 (Paul Finkelman
& Tim Alan Garrison eds., 2009) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA].
34. Id. at 726.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 724.
37. Id. at 725.
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tribal confederacies, governments based on towns or pueblos, and systems in
which authority rested in heads of kinship groups or clans." Yet as more and
more colonists flooded the country, asserting their dominion over the
territories once held by native peoples, tribal sovereignty began to shrink. The
legal status of tribes quickly grew clouded, and uncertainties were left to the
Supreme Court to resolve.
The Court first acknowledged the independence of tribes in Worcester v.
Georgia." It was there that Chief Justice Marshall described the tribes as
"distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural
rights."' The decision acknowledged that the rights granted to tribes to
govern their members and territories flowed from a preexisting sovereignty
that was limited, but not abolished, by the tribes' inclusion within the
territorial bounds of the United States.4' Marshall's decision in Worcester
formally recognized tribal nations as sovereign states, but the doctrine of
sovereign immunity would continue to evolve for the next 150 years.
A. Sovereign Immunity
Following the Revolutionary War, the United States continued to abide by
many of the principles established in English common law, including the idea
of sovereign immunity. But tribal nations would not truly obtain such
immunity until 1919. "Although scholars have identified earlier cases that
allude to tribal sovereign immunity, many sources, including the Court itself,
point to Turner v. UnitedStates andthe Creek Nation ofIndians(1919).'2 In
Turner the Supreme Court recognized that immunity was an inherent part of
sovereignty and could possibly be used as a defense from suit in tort
litigation.43
Following Turner, courts began to question the circumstances in which the
doctrine would be recognized. This led to little formal acknowledgment
throughout the United States. Yet the Supreme Court solidified tribal
sovereign immunity in 1940 in the case of United States v. United States
Fidelity& GuarantyCo." The Supreme Court held that as a matter of federal
38. COHEN, supra note 1, at 204.

39. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
40. Id. at 559.

41. Id.
42. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 33, at 723.
43. Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 357-58 (1919).
44. 309 U.S. 506 (1940). In Fidelity & Guaranty the United States sought (on its own
behalf and on behalf of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations) to set aside a Missouri state-court
ruling issuing a credit against the Indian tribes based on coal-mining leases made by the United
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law an Indian tribe could only be subject to a state court's ruling when
Congress had explicitly authorized such suit.45
Although Turnerand Fidelity& Guarantyset the groundwork for sovereign
immunity status in the United States, courts have continued to shape the
contours of immunity. Since 1940 the doctrine has continuously been modified
by subsequent legislation and court decisions. Congress has recognized the
doctrine in various forms," and the Supreme Court continues to issue opinions
that profile tribal sovereign status. 47 Because of the legislative and judicial
support of the doctrine, sovereign immunity has been continuously extended
to tribes by lower courts with few exceptions and little opposition.
B. Tribal/GovernmentRelations
Because tribes are considered sovereign under law, this makes them very
unusual legal entities in our system of jurisprudence. A tribe needs no
authority from the federal government to govern itself.48 Rather, a tribe is its
own source of power. Therefore, the proper inquiry is not whether authority
has been granted to permit a tribe to act in a certain manner, but rather whether
any limitation has been placed on the tribe to prevent it from acting within the
realm of tribal sovereignty.49
Nevertheless, tribal sovereign immunity is not absolute. Like all governing
powers within the United States, tribes remain held in check by the federal

States on the tribes' behalf. Id. at 510-11. The Court found that a sovereign should not be
subject to cross-claims away from its own forum just because a debtor is unavailable within its
own jurisdiction. Id. at 512-13.
45. Id. at 512.
46. See 16 U.S.C. § 3378 (2006) (disclaiming effect of environmental statute on any
recognized rights of tribal immunity); 25 U.S.C. § 450f(c)(3) (2006) (authorizing waiver of
tribal immunity in insurance policies); 25 U.S.C. § 476(f) (2006) (prohibiting new regulations
that diminish tribal immunities in place); 25 U.S.C. § 490 (2006) (authorization to waive
immunity for a loan); 25 U.S.C. § 3746 (2006) (agricultural land management); 30 U.S.C. §
1733 (2006) (providing that a tribe must waive defense of sovereign immunity for wrongful
disclosure of confidential information).
47. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). "As separate sovereigns
pre-existing the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those
constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state authority." Id.
at 56. "Indian tribes have long been recognized as possessing the common-law immunity from
suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers." Id. at 58; see also Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs.,
Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498
U.S. 505 (1991).
48. See, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 149 (1982).
49. See Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 852-53 (1985).
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government. Chief Justice Marshall articulated this federal dominance when
he detailed the disabilities arising in the context of tribal sovereignty. In
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, Marshall described the tribal-government
relationship as "that of a ward to his guardian."so Tribes were thence to be
considered as domestic dependents, relying on the United States to watch over
them." This statement of the law was created by Marshall as an extraconstitutional power. Despite the fact that it does not appear in the text of the
Constitution, the language has widely been considered the defining source of
tribal power within the United States ever since."
Originally the Supreme Court placed only two restrictions on tribes as a
result of their domestic dependent status: tribes could not freely alienate their
lands, and they could not make treaties with foreign powers.s1 These
limitations remained the only two restrictions on tribal power for almost 150
years. Then, in the 1978 case of Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, the Supreme
Court found that tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians inherently
conflicted with a tribe's domestic dependent status. 54
Following the Court's decision in Oliphant, the door was open for other
inherent limitations to be placed on tribal power. Of those cases limiting tribal
power, most notable is the case of Montana v. United States.55 Montana
expressed a "general proposition" that an Indian tribe could not use its inherent
sovereign powers to regulate the activities of nonmembers on Indian land. 6
But the court then announced two exceptions to this general rule.
To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to
exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their
reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate,
through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of
nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or
its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or
other arrangements. A tribe may also retain inherent power to
exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee
lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has

50. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).

51. Id.
52. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 122 (discussing the sources of and justifications for the
canons of construction in Indian law).
53. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.

54. 435 U.S. 191, 207-09 (1978).
55. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
56. Id. at 565.
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some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security,
or the health or welfare of the tribe."
Despite Montana's limitation on tribal authority, tribes still retained broad
authority in Indian Country, limited only when no significant tribal interest
was at stake. Subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court, however, presented
a narrower understanding of Montanaand its two exceptions. For example, in
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation," the
Court held that the Yakima Nation did not possess inherent authority to impose
zoning restrictions over nonmember-owned lands in an area where half the
acreage was owned in fee by nonmembers. 9 The Court in Brendale stated that
although Montana recognized a tribe's ability to retain inherent power to
exercise civil authority, that ability was not absolute and did not encompass all
conduct affecting the political and economic welfare of the tribe."o Later, in
Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley,' the Court reasoned that the Navajo Nation
had failed to justify its authority to impose a tax on hotel guests under either
of Montana's exceptions, and that the tax was presumptively invalid based
upon "Montana's general rule that Indian tribes lack civil authority over
nonmembers on non-Indian fee land."62
Since Montana, it seems clear that the Supreme Court has certainly been
more inclined to deflate a tribe's inherent power to govern. Yet tribal
sovereignty continues to act as a shield against states imposing their laws in
Indian Country. Present legal jurisprudence provides only two instances in
which a tribe may be haled into state courts. An Indian tribe may be subject
to suit where Congress has "unequivocally" authorized the suit or where the
tribe has "clearly" waived its sovereign-immunity status.63 The Supreme Court
has clearly defined the relationship between modem tribal sovereignty and
state power. Unless a tribe has expressed an unequivocal waiver of immunity
or Congress has clearly and unmistakably preempted tribal sovereignty, state

57. Id. at 565-66.
58. 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (plurality opinion).
59. Id. at 428 (plurality opinion).
60. Id. at 428-29 (plurality opinion).
61. 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
62. Id. at 654.
63. Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998) ("As a matter of federal
law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe
has waived its immunity."); see also Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian
Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991) ("Suits against Indian tribes are thus barred by sovereign
immunity absent a clear waiver by the tribe or congressional abrogation.").
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courts will have no power to subject an Indian tribe to suit in their court
systems.6"
Bittle does not involve whether the tribe can utilize an inherent tribal power,
so there is not a question of whether the federal government has taken such
power away. Rather, the question is whether a state may assert its power over
a tribe and its agency. For this to occur, the State of Oklahoma must have
been given that power by the United States government, or else it must be
proven that the tribe expressed a clear waiver of immunity to private civil suits
in state court. Neither happened in the present case.
Finally, as with federal and state immunity, courts are often asked to assess
whether tribal entities share in the tribe's immunity from suit. The Supreme
Court has yet to develop a clear bright-line test to determine whether tribal
businesses or agencies share in a tribe's sovereign immunity." Yet some
courts have found that if the entity serves as an "arm" of the tribe, tribal
sovereign immunity generally extends to the various agencies of the tribe."
"Tribes enjoy immunity from suits on contracts, whether those contracts
involve governmental or commercial activities and whether they were made
on or off a reservation."6 This is recognized in part because the United States
places heavy emphasis in encouraging tribal economic development.
Furthermore, tribes use such entities to carry out daily governmental and
business operations. Tribal casinos play a major role in tribal economic
development. They are often set up by government compacts between tribes
and states. 69 Tribes run and oversee most casino operations. And the casino
receives most of its funding from tribal government. Given the case law and
policies involved, the tribe as well as its agent-in this case, Thunderbird
Casino-may shield itself from state power under the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.

64. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 760.
65. See Gavle v. Little Six, Inc., 555 N.W.2d 284, 293 (Minn. 1996).
66. Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that tribal
casino, as arm of tribe, had sovereign immunity in suit by employee); see also Weeks Constr.,
Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Hous. Auth., 797 F.2d 668, 670-71 (8th Cir. 1986); Wilson v. Turtle
Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, 459 F. Supp. 366, 368-69 (D.N.D. 1978).
67. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 760.
68. Id. at 757 ("We retained the doctrine [of tribal sovereign immunity] ... on the theory
that Congress had failed to abrogate it in order to promote economic development and tribal
self-sufficiency.").
69. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,48-50 (1996). This is because certain
types of gaming are prohibited without the presence of such a compact under the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006). Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 48-49.
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III. The FirstDrink: Rice v. Rehner
Questions of state power in relation to Indian tribes are to be treated as
issues of preemption. This means that the federal government has chosen to
govern the area of federal Indian law completely and therefore precludes states
from enacting their own laws concerning the same area. The preemption
analysis in Indian law is unlike all other modern preemption analyses,
however.o Preemption usually occurs in one of two ways: either Congress
enacts a law that explicitly removes state or local authority, or a court
determines through judicial examination that the federal government intended
that state law be preempted."
On the other hand, preemption of state power in Indian law does not require
an express congressional statement or preemptive intent to invalidate state
law.72 Rather, the Indian sovereignty doctrine provides a "backdrop" of
sovereignty against which all other law must be read." Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has held that "[s]tate jurisdiction is preempted by the operation
of federal law if it interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal
interests."74 Yet although the usual absence of state power to regulate tribal
action in Indian Country is clearly emphasized," a few small cracks have
begun to appear in the barrier that precludes state power. One of these
exceptional circumstances comes out of Rice v. Rehner.
Rehner features the most extreme application of the preemption doctrine to
limit tribal immunity. In this case tribes were held, rather surprisingly, to have
lost any preemptive power to regulate liquor sales on their reservations as a
consequence of their domestic dependent status. The issue in Rehner was
whether the State of California could require a tribal member to obtain a state
liquor license even when the liquor store was operated within reservation
lands. 78 Under federal law, such sales were made legal if they were in
conformity with the laws of the state.7 ' The Supreme Court ultimately held

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980).
Id.
Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Conm'n, 380 U.S. 685,690 (1965).
McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 (1983).
See, e.g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 381 (1976).
463 U.S. 713 (1983).
Id. at 722.
Id. at 715.
18 U.S.C. § 1161 (2006).
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that extensive federal regulation for more than a century, with no tradition of
tribal authority over liquor sales, preempted the tribe from any ability to
exclude the operation of state law.so
The holding in Rehner is surprising. The Supreme Court used an analysis
that completely contradicted its usual preemption doctrine. As shown above,
extensive federal regulation combined with the backdrop of tribal immunity
usually preempts the state from exercising jurisdiction. But in reasoning
unlikely to be repeated, the tribe itself was held to be preempted by the
exercise of federal regulation. Moreover, the unusual preemption analysis in
Rehner is not the only surprising facet of the decision. The opinion goes even
further to hold that tribes lost their inherent power to regulate liquor as a
consequence of their domestic dependent status."
The expansive approach to preemption in Rehner remains an exception, and
it has not been regarded as a significant expansion of the usual rule that states
are preempted from asserting their power over matters concerning tribal
sovereignty. Arguments can therefore be made regarding the Supreme Court's
analysis in Rehner. But Rehner is not completely without merit. In Rehner,
the Supreme Court recognized the traditional backdrop of tribal sovereignty.
The Court stated that "[w]hen we determine that tradition has recognized a
sovereign immunity in favor of the Indians in some respect, then we usually
are reluctant to infer that Congress has authorized the assertion of state
authority in that respect 'except where Congress has expressly provided that
State laws shall apply."' 82
The Supreme Court went on to say that "[i]f . .. we do not find such a
tradition . . . our pre-emption analysis may accord less weight to the

'backdrop' of tribal sovereignty."" The Court ultimately concluded that
"tradition simply [had] not recognized a sovereign immunity or inherent
Rather, tradition
authority in favor of liquor regulation by Indians."'
displayed a complete prohibition of alcohol in Indian Country.s
Indeed, Congress had "imposed complete prohibition" in Indian Country by
1832," lasting until Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1161. Therefore, the

80. Rehner, 463 U.S. at 724-25.
81. Id. at 726.
82. Id. at 719-20 (quoting McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 171

(1973)).
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 720.
Id. at 722.
Id.
Id.
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Supreme Court's conclusion that § 1161 supported the application of state
alcohol regulationcan be understood, although reasonable minds can certainly
differ on the issue. Yet it is absurd that the Oklahoma Supreme Court would
attempt to adjudicatea case by relying on a holding that only permits a state
to regulate. This is especially true when neither Congress nor the Supreme
Court has expressly provided for such an action.
Looking at Bittle with the traditional view that states are prohibited from
asserting power over sovereign tribes, it is clear that the State of Oklahoma
would not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the present dram-shop dispute. But
the Oklahoma Supreme Court did not use the traditional preemption analysis.
Instead it employed the non-traditional preemption approach used in Rehner.
The preemption analysis utilized in Rehner is an unusual one. It offered
less weight to the backdrop of tribal immunity when history revealed federal
regulation regarding the subject matter in question. Therefore, in order for the
court to accord less weight to tribal sovereignty and succeed, it must have
shown that the federal government historically regulated the area of private
civil actions. This should have forced the Oklahoma Supreme Court into a
fact-specific inquiry rather than extending the reasoning in Rehner. Rehner
involved whether Indian tribes had traditionally regulated the business of
alcohol within reservation lands. Therefore, the holding in Rehner must be
limited to a state's ability to regulate alcohol transactions. Yet the court in
Bittle extended the holding in Rehner to encompass the adjudication of civil
tort liability. This was wrong.
There is a distinct difference between civil regulatoryjurisdiction and civil
adjudicatoryjurisdiction. "There is a difference between the right to demand
compliance with state law and the [private] means available to enforce them.""
A state's power to regulate certain tribal activity and the ability of a private
individual to bring a lawsuit against a tribe in state court cannot be made
coextensive. Specifically, although sovereign immunity may not be asserted
to bar the former, it certainly may be asserted to bar the latter. As such, the
appropriate inquiry should have been whether Indian tribes have traditionally
been held liable in state courts for private civil tort actions-the answer to
which is clearly no. Therefore, unlike in Rehner, the backdrop of sovereign
immunity must be applied in further analyzing whether the tribe waived its
immunity or Congress abrogated it.
As shown above, inherent in the doctrine of sovereign immunity is the
notion that sovereign nations cannot be haled into state court unless such

87. Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 755 (1998).
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immunity has been expressly waived by the tribe or such immunity has been
expressly taken away." Yet the Oklahoma Supreme Court never addressed
this question. Instead, it reasoned that the claim arose from an accident
occurring on a state highway and therefore occurred outside the reservation
and within the traditional jurisdiction of the State. Although this is true, the
court wrongfully focused its attention on the place of injury rather than on the
party to the suit. Tradition certainly favors state jurisdiction in such
circumstances when the parties are individuals. But tradition has never
acknowledged a state's ability to bring a sovereign tribe into state court."
Rehner cannot rationally be interpreted to give adjudicatory power to the
State of Oklahoma. Rather, proper weight should have been given to the
backdrop of tribal sovereign immunity in further analyzing whether the tribe
waived its immunity or whether Congress had taken the immunity away.
IV Order Up Another Round: 18 US.C. § 1161
Tribal sovereign immunity is a matter of federal law." Although Congress
can certainly alter its parameters, the Supreme Court has held that it can do so
only "through explicit legislation."' "Explicit legislation" requires answering
whether Congress has by unequivocal expression of intent taken away a tribe's
sovereign immunity. This test is strict, and it should be interpreted with close
scrutiny.
The preemption doctrine has certainly made it quite difficult to draw a
bright line in determining when a state may assume jurisdiction in Indian
Country. Yet this does not change the fact that the Supreme Court still
presumes that states are preempted from asserting their jurisdiction over tribes.
The primary impact of preemption has been in areas of taxation and regulation,

88. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505,509(1991)
("Suits against Indian tribes are thus barred by sovereign immunity absent a clear waiver by the
tribe or congressional abrogation.").
89. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 754 ("As a matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to
suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity."); Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49,58 (1978); see also Citizen Band Potawatomi,498 U.S.
at 509 ("Suits against Indian tribes are thus barred by sovereign immunity absent a clear waiver
by the tribe or congressional abrogation."); Weeks Constr., Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Hous. Auth.,
797 F.2d 668, 670-71 (8th Cir. 1986); Wilson v. Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians,
459 F. Supp. 366, 368-69 (D.N.D. 1978) (stating that sovereignty will be upheld whether
conduct occurs on or off the reservation).
90. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 759.
91. Id.
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rather than adjudication." This is because the Supreme Court has been
extraordinarily protective of civil adjudicatoryjurisdiction over tribes and their
entities. For example, in Iowa MutualInsurance Co. v. LaPlante,the Supreme
Court stated: "If state-court jurisdiction over Indians or activities on Indian
lands would interfere with tribal sovereignty and self-government, the state
courts are generally divested of jurisdiction as a matter of federal law.""
Furthermore, following Congress's amendment of Public Law 2804 in
1968, Congress has never intended to provide states with the authority to
assume civil adjudicatory jurisdiction without tribal consent." In light of this,
18 U.S.C. § 1161 cannot be interpreted to hold the opposite. The court in
Bittle reasoned that the Oklahoma dram-shop law could be included within the
language "laws of the state" found within § 1161. This argument appears valid
on its face, yet with a detailed consideration, it is completely inconsistent with
the legal precedent set before it.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court failed to consider the proper rules of
statutory construction in interpreting a statute where Indians are a party to a
suit. The standard principles of statutory construction do not have their usual
force in cases involving Indian law. Due to the "unique trust relationship
between the United States and the Indians,"96 "statutes are to be construed
liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their
benefit."97 As a general rule, "[a]mbiguities in federal law have been
construed generously [in favor of tribes] in order to comport with . . . the

federal policy of encouraging" tribal economic development and
independence.9 8 The rule "reflects an altogether proper reluctance by the
judiciary to assume that Congress has chosen further to disadvantage a people
whom our Nation long ago reduced to a state of dependency."99

92. See Citizen Band Potawatomi,498 U.S. 505; Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983);
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980);
Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977).
93. 480 U.S. 9, 15 (1987).
94. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (2006).
95. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 900 F.2d 1164, 1172 (8th Cir. 1990).
96. Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985).
97. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985).
98. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 152 (1982) (quoting White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143-44 (1980)).
99. South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498, 520 (1986) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
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The canons of construction, which mandate statutory interpretations in favor
of tribes, will apply only when the federal statute in question is ambiguous.'o
A statute will be "ambiguous" and thus should be interpreted in favor of the
tribe if it is "capable of being understood in two or more possible senses or
ways."'o' It is clear from the case law present in the Bittle action that
ambiguity surrounds § 1161. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals
concluded that § 1161 did not clearly grant states the power to adjudicate civil
tort claims against sovereign tribes.' 02 Yet the Oklahoma Supreme Court
reasoned that it did. Furthermore, three other courts throughout the United
States confronted with the exact issue presented in Bittle found that § 1161 did
not clearly give the state such civil adjudicatory power."0 '
Moreover, the terms relied on by the Oklahoma Supreme Court found in §
1161 cannot be construed as limitless. If Indian tribes were subject to every
"law of the state" regarding alcohol transactions, then tribes would be subject
to every private dram-shop dispute in which they were involved. This includes
those dram-shop disputes where the injury results from an accident occurring
on tribal lands. The court relied heavily on the location of the accident as
support for its ruling. If the accident had occurred in the casino parking lot,
however, it is undisputed that the state would have no jurisdiction. 0 4 The
court directly contradicts established interpretations of applicable Indian law
by holding § 1161 applicable in one instance where it is clearly inapplicable
in another.
When enacting § 1161, Congress had full knowledge of present Indian law
and the Supreme Court's long-standing Indian-law canons of construction.'0 o
Congress made no mention of giving to the states civil adjudicatory power in
§ 1161 despite its knowledge that federal Indian statutes would be interpreted

100. Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84,99 (2001); see also Catawba,476 U.S.
at 520 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. at 766.
101. ChickasawNation,534 U.S. at 90 (citation omitted); United States v. White Plume, 447
F.3d 1067, 1074 (8th Cir. 2006).
102. Bittle v. Bahe, 192 P.3d 810, 814 (Okla. 2008).
103. Filer v. Tohono O'odhamNation Gaming Enter., 129 P.3d 78,85 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006);
Holguin v. Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo, 954 S.W.2d 843, 850 (Tex. App. 1997); Foxworthy v.
Puyallup Tribe of Indians Ass'n, 169 P.3d 53, 56 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
104. See generally Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (holding that states are without
jurisdiction when a non-Indian plaintiff brings suit against an Indian defendant where the action
arose in Indian Country).
105. See McNaryv. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479,496 (1991) ("It is presumable
that Congress legislates with knowledge of our basic rules of statutory construction .... ).
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in favor of tribes. If Congress intended to grant such rights, it would have
expressly defined such parameters when enacting § 1161.
Finally, although courts are directed to interpret ambiguities in favor of
Indian tribes, their constructions must be reasonable and in accord with
legislative intent and purpose.1 o6 Statutory provisions that are unclear on their
face, as is the case with § 1161, may be made clear from the surrounding
circumstances and legislative history.'
It is clear that by 1953, federal laws curtailing liquor transactions within
Congress therefore
Indian Country were viewed as discriminatory.'
introduced a bill (later enacted into law as § 1161) that was intended only to
"terminate Federal discriminations against the Indians of Arizona."'" In a
hearing on the original bill, Representative John J. Rhodes, Jr. of Arizona
stated that the bill's sole purpose was to eliminate federal alcohol prohibition
on Indian lands because it had a detrimental effect on tribes and was
discriminatory by nature."0 This illustrates that § 1161 was passed primarily
for the benefit of Indians and was intended only to regulate alcohol sales. The
bill was later revised to include all states, not just Arizona. In making these
revisions, Bureau of Indian Affairs Commissioner Dillon S. Meyer stated that
"[w]e certainly do not intend to revise State laws regarding Indians or anyone
else . . . ."'" Rather, the intention of the bill was not to interfere with existing

law. Therefore, Congress had no intention of changing the law allowing tribes
the right to assert sovereign immunity.
The court in Bittle extrapolates from Rehner the notion that § 1161 was
intended to remove all discrimination, but that Indians still had to comply with
state law in every regard. The court went on to infer that Congress intended
to waive tribal sovereign immunity to private tort actions based on state dramshop violations. But, unlike the circumstances in Rehner, the court in Bittle
provided no legislative history supporting this conclusion. "Central to
[Rehner's] holding was the long-standing lack of tribal control over alcohol,
which had always been subject to regulation by some non-tribal government

106. United States v. Howard, 8 F. Supp. 617, 619 (N.D. Okla. 1934).
107. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 206 (1978).
108. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 726 (1983).
109. See id.at 726-27 (citing Hearingson H.R. 1055 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs
of the House Comm. on Interiorand InsularAffairs, 83d Cong. (Mar. 18, 1953) [hereinafter
Hearings]). The Court in Rehner notes that the subcommittee hearings were not officially
published. Id. at 727 n.12.
110. Id. at 727.
111. Id. (quoting Hearings).
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entity. . . ."ll Congressional intent behind § 1161 was also ample to support
state regulation of alcohol. Yet there is no analogous legislative history or
intent to support subjecting tribes to private dram-shop causes of action.
Rehner clearly demands compliance with state law, but neither it nor § 1161
addresses private rights of action to enforce state law against an Indian tribe.
This is undoubtedly because there is an inherent difference between a state's
regulation of alcohol and an individual's ability to collect monetary damages
arising out of an alcohol-related accident."' The Supreme Court's waiver of
sovereign immunity for the former in Rehner does not waive sovereign
immunity for the latter.' 14
The legislative history surrounding § 1161 never references tribal sovereign
immunity. Moreover, it does not provide a waiver of such immunity for dramshop-related litigation. The Oklahoma Supreme Court's reasoning simply
does not follow the United States Supreme Court's precedent in interpreting
§ 1161 in favor of the tribe. Furthermore, the court's analysis in Bittle is
unreasonable in light of the congressional intent in enacting § 1161. Such
reasoning in no way comports with the "present federal policy favor[ing] the
strengthening of tribal self-government.""'
The Bittle decision further ignores the "presumption that a statute is not
intended to make a radical change in Indian affairs" unless such a purpose is
made explicitly clear by Congress." 6 "[W]here the statutes and their
legislative histories fail to clearly establish such an intent, the Court may not
supply one by judicial interpretation.""' Giving a state the power to force an
Indian tribe into state court and hold them liable under state law is certainly a
radical change in Indian affairs. The State of Oklahoma has never had the
power to adjudicate such disputes, nor has an Indian tribe ever been liable for
damages under a state law to which they did not personally consent.
The court in Bittle takes a great leap ofjurisprudence to find that 18 U.S.C.
§ 1161 and Rehner are dispositive of the issue concerning sovereign immunity
as it relates to private dram-shop actions. Three other appellate courts have
112. Foxworthy v. Puyallup Tribe of Indians Ass'n, 169 P.3d 53, 57 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
113. Holguin v. Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo, 954 S.W.2d 843, 854 (Tex. App. 1997).
114. Id.
115. Logan v. Andrus, 457 F. Supp. 1318, 1324 (N.D. Okla. 1978) (citing Bryan v. Itasca
County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976)).
116. Id. at 1325; see also Bryan, 426 U.S. at 390; United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 599
(1916); United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 290 (1909).
117. Logan, 457 F. Supp. at 1325 (quoting Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110, 1142
(D.D.C. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Harjo v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1978)) (emphasis
added).
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been confronted with the precise issue faced in Bittle."' All three courts
unanimously concluded that Rehner and its interpretation of § 1161 could not
be extended in cases of private dram-shop actions."' The courts agreed that
a tribe's sovereign immunity extends to its commercial and governmental
activities both on and off the reservation and provides a defense to suits filed
in state court. The Oklahoma Supreme Court remains the only court to hold
that § 1161 granted states the power to adjudicate such disputes.
V A Few Too Many: Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
The federal government has taken significant steps in recent years to
encourage tribal economic development. It has been a goal of the federal
government to reduce the dependency status of tribes and assist Indians in
breaking free from a long history of economic depression.' 20 Tribes, however,
have only recently begun to take advantage of these economic incentives.
Accordingly, such encouragement authorizes Indian tribes to waive their
sovereign immunity for purposes that it sees as fit.' 2 ' Such waivers are usually
utilized to entice outside businesses onto reservation lands. Thus, other than
the explicit congressional grant of jurisdiction discussed in the previous
section, the only other method by which a state may obtain jurisdiction over
an Indian tribe is the waiver of sovereign immunity by the tribe itself.
The United States Supreme Court has clearly stated that a tribe's waiver of
sovereign immunity may not be implied, but must be unequivocally
expressed.'22 The extent to which a clause constitutes a waiver of the tribe's
sovereign immunity, if at all, turns on the exact terms of that clause.'23 Thus,
in a contract to which an Indian tribe is a party, explicit language broadly
disclaiming immunity constitutes a waiver of tribal sovereignty, 24 and
"language that is ambiguous rather than definite, cryptic rather than explicit,
or precatory rather than mandatory, usually will not achieve that end."'2 5
118. Filer v. Tohono O'odham Nation Gaming Enter., 129 P.3d 78 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006);
Holguin, 954 S.W.2d 843; Foxworthy v. Puyallup Tribe of Indians Ass'n, 169 P.3d 53, 56
(Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
119. Filer, 129 P.3d at 85; Holguin, 954 S.W.2d at 850; Foxworthy, 169 P.3d at 56.
120. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980).
121. 25 U.S.C. §§ 476-477 (2006).
122. C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatorni Indian Tribe, 532 U.S. 411, 418
(2001); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978).
123. Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 21,30
(1st Cir. 2000).

124. Id.
125. Id. at 31.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2009

142

AMERICAN INDIAN LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 34

It has been argued, as the Oklahoma Supreme Court attempts to do in Bittle,
that a waiver of immunity may be inferred from certain tribal commercial
activities. This argument is based on the premise that tribes were not intended
to be "'super citizens' . . . free from all but self-imposed regulations." 26 Yet
federal and state courts have consistently refused to acknowledge such
arguments, both because of the explicit waiver requirement set out by the
United States Supreme Court and because of the goals of the United States in
fostering tribal economic and political development.' 27
It is clearly set out in the facts of Bittle and in the Oklahoma Supreme
Court's reasoning that there was never a clear, express waiver of sovereign
immunity on the part of the tribe sufficient to render the tribe subject to suit.
There is nothing in the Oklahoma Beverage Control Act 128 that states the tribe
consented to any kind of suit in state court for private civil tort claims simply
by virtue of accepting a state liquor license. Therefore, under the laws of the
United States, the tribe did not waive immunity as a result of its agreement to
be bound by the provisions of the Oklahoma Beverage Control Act.
Yet the court in Bittle reasoned that when a tribe agrees to be bound by the
Oklahoma Beverage Control Act, it waives sovereign immunity. This
reasoning flies in the face of United States Supreme Court jurisprudence. In
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, the Supreme Court held that waivers of
sovereign immunity by Indian tribes "must be unequivocally expressed."l 2 9
The Oklahoma Beverage Control Act is simply a statutory scheme to regulate
alcoholic beverages within the state of Oklahoma. Nowhere in the Act is there
explicit, unequivocal language stating that Indian tribes waive their sovereign
immunity by complying with the terms and provisions of the Act.
It is true that courts often recognize a tribe's express waiver through
treaties, compacts, or other express agreements. Therefore, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court should have looked to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.'
This Act provides that compacts may, and in some cases must, be entered into
between Indian tribes and the State prior to a tribe's commencement of gaming
operations.'"' The Act states that compacts may include provisions relating to
"the application of the criminal and civil laws and regulations of the Indian
tribe or the State . . . [and] the allocation of criminal and civil jurisdiction

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Bittle v. Bahe, 192 P.3d 810, 819 (Okla. 2008).
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1974).
37 OKLA. STAT. §§ 501-599 (2001).
436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (quoting United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969)).
25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2006).
Id. § 2710(d)(1)(C).
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between the State and the Indian tribe" necessary to enforce such laws,
regulations, remedies, and other matters concerning gaming operations.132
As a matter of fact, gaming compacts entered into between Indian tribes and
the State of Oklahoma include provisions and remedies for tort claims that
arise out of incidents occurring at gaming facilities. It is interesting to note,
however, that the gaming compact was never mentioned or relied upon by the
majority in the Bittle decision. This is likely due to the fact that the court felt
no need to consult the gaming compact because it was able to find an implicit
waiver of sovereign immunity under the Oklahoma Beverage Control Act. But
even if the Oklahoma Supreme Court had consulted the gaming compact, it
would have been unable to find any explicit waiver of tribal sovereign
immunity regarding off-reservation tort claims.
Gaming compacts between the State of Oklahoma and Indian tribes
(including the Absentee Shawnee Tribe) are directed by the provisions of the
Model Tribal Gaming Compact.' 33 In turning to the specific provisions of the
Model Tribal Gaming Compact, it is clear that the State would not have
jurisdiction concerning Bittle's dram-shop claims against the tribe. This is
because the Absentee Shawnee Tribe did not waive immunity with respect to
dram-shop actions.
Part 6 of the Model Tribal Gaming Compact provides specific limited
consent to suit for tort actions. Within this section, the tribe acknowledges that
patronsof the gamingfacility should be "afforded due process in seeking and
receiving just and reasonable compensation for a tort claim for personal injury
or property damage against the [gaming] enterprise arising out of incidents
occurring at a facility."l 3 4 But the Compact then goes on to say that the tribe
consents to suit on a "limited basis," and no other consent to suit with respect
to tort claims or any other claims against the tribe may be made.' The tribe's
consent to tort claims thus extends only to patronswho actually claim to have
been injured at the facility."' Moreover, the Compact defines a "patron" as
"any person who is on the premises of a gaming facility, for the purpose of
According to the
playing covered games authorized by this Compact."'
terms of the Compact, Bittle was not a patron at the tribe's casino on the night

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(i)-(ii).
3A OKLA. STAT. § 281 (Supp. 2004).
Id. § 281 at pt. 6(A).
Id. § 281 at pt. 6(A)(2).
Id. § 281 at pt. 6(C)(1).
Id. § 281 at pt. 3(20).
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of the accident. Therefore, the tribe did not consent to her dram-shop claim,
and such claim is still barred by the tribe's sovereign immunity.
If the Compact's inherent purpose is to provide a remedy to those injured
as a result of improper conduct within the casino, then the Oklahoma
Legislature should amend the Model Tribal Gaming Compact expressly to
include dram-shop claims or those claims made by non-patron third parties.
In such cases the tribe would then consent to suit in courts of competent
jurisdiction, and future plaintiffs would not be left without a remedy. As the
Compact currently exists, however, no waiver of tribal sovereign immunity to
such claims can legitimately be argued.
VI. The Hangover:Pitfalls of the Bittle Decision
The court in Bittle established that the State of Oklahoma has the power to
adjudicate dram-shop disputes between non-Indian citizens and sovereign
tribes. As discussed above, this is certainly a leap in jurisprudence. Even if
the tribe's immunity status is eliminated, however, a state court still may not
have proper jurisdiction to adjudicate the dram-shop dispute. First, the cause
of action may be held to have arisen in Indian Country, thus giving the tribe
exclusive jurisdiction. Furthermore, because in a dram-shop action the alleged
breach and subsequent injury often occur in different jurisdictions, choice-oflaw considerations must be made.
As discussed in Part I, dram-shop statutes are designed to place a degree of
limits on those authorized to sell and serve intoxicating beverages. The
fundamental purpose of dram-shop liability is to provide a remedy to those
injured by the illegal sale of intoxicating beverages.' Thus, a determination
of whether a duty has been breached in a dram-shop action depends upon
whether an alcohol vendor excessively served a patron. The negligent conduct
can occur only within the vendor's facility. It follows that the negligent action
under dram-shop laws-the breach of one's duty not to serve excessive
amounts of alcohol to a patron-could have occurred only inside the casino
and on tribal lands.
Because the conduct in question clearly occurred on tribal lands, the next
question must then be whether states have the power to adjudicate private civil
claims arising in Indian Country. The United States Supreme Court has held
that state courts have absolutely no jurisdiction over claims between nonIndians and Indians (or a tribe without immunity) when the cause of action

138. See generally Brigance v. Velvet Dove Rest., Inc., 725 P.2d 300 (Okla. 1986).
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arises in Indian Country."' Such claims are to remain within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the tribe.'" In fact, in the civil law context, Congress has never
enacted general nationwide legislation to provide a federal or state forum for
disputes between Indians and non-Indians arising in Indian Country.14 1
The Supreme Court's clearest articulation ofjurisdiction in Indian Country
came in Williams v. Lee, a civil case that involved a non-Indian plaintiff suing
an Indian defendant for the purchase price of goods sold to the Indians on the
Navajo reservation.14 2 The Supreme Court held that state courts have no
jurisdiction over such actions.'43 Justice Hugo Black's opinion for the
majority laid heavy emphasis upon Worcester v. Georgia and Chief Justice
John Marshall's proposition that state law had no force in Indian country.
Justice Black then added: "Over the years this Court has modified these
principles in cases where essential tribal relations were not involved and where
the rights of Indians would not be jeopardized, but the basic policy of
Worcester has remained."'4
Although Williams remains the seminal case on tribal civil adjudicatory
jurisdiction, the United States has taken some measures to limit its application.
In 1953, the United States Congress enacted Public Law 280.145 With its
enactment, the law delegated criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian lands
Thus, in California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and
to five states."
Wisconsin, tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction over Indian-owned lands became
severely limited. In addition, Public Law 280 presented the remaining states
with the opportunity to assume the same civil and criminal jurisdiction over
tribal lands.147 Of the remaining states, only ten chose to accept jurisdiction
in some fashion over tribal lands.148
Congress amended Public Law 280 in 1968. The amendment effectively
abolished a state's unilateral ability to adopt criminal and civil jurisdiction
over Indian lands.149 The 1968 revisions now require a state to obtain tribal

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
Id.
Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 855 n.17 (1985).
358 U.S. 217 (1959).
Id. at 223.
Id. at 219.
18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (2006).
COHEN, supranote 1, at 544.
Id.

148. Id.
149. 25 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006) ("State jurisdiction acquired pursuant to this subchapter with
respect to criminal offenses or civil causes of action, or with respect to both, shall be applicable
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consent by a majority vote in a special election in order to assume such
Since that time, no state-including Oklahoma-has ever
jurisdiction.'
assumed jurisdiction pursuant to Public Law 280.2s' Therefore, absent Public
Law 280, Oklahoma state courts lack jurisdiction to hear actions against
Indians arising on tribal lands.
It is clear that Oklahoma was not one of the original five states given
Furthermore, Oklahoma "has
jurisdiction under Public Law 280.152
demonstrated neither that it acquired jurisdiction prior to the 1968 requirement
of tribal consent, nor that the Tribes have consented to the State's assumption
of jurisdiction."' 53 Lastly, the Oklahoma Supreme Court recognizes that
"tribal consent alone, even if present, would not be enough to clothe the State
with jurisdiction over Indian Country."'" In discussing this point, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court properly stated:
Whether a state has under the current version of [Public Law] 280
validly asserted concurrent jurisdiction must be demonstrated by
the means used in effecting a transfer of jurisdiction. Although a
disclaimer state-such as Oklahoma-need not amend its
constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a post-i 968 opinion, stated
that it must still ". . . take positive action before [Public Law] 280

jurisdiction can become effective."'
Therefore, following the precedent in Williams, and in the absence of Public
Law 280, Oklahoma does not have any civil adjudicatory power to settle
disputes that arise in Indian Country and involve an Indian defendant. This is
true despite the unusual circumstances surrounding Bittle. Dram-shop actions,
unlike most tort actions where breach and injury occur simultaneously, involve
a breach and subsequent injury that may take place in separate locations. Due
to the action's unique nature, many courts have undertaken a choice-of-law

in Indian country only where the enrolled Indians within the affected area of such Indian
country accept such jurisdiction by a majority vote of the adult Indians voting at a special
election held for that purpose. The Secretary of the Interior shall call such special election
under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, when requested to do so by the tribal
council or other governing body, or by 20 per centum of such enrolled adults.").
150. Id.
151. COHEN, supra note 1, at 545.
152. State ex rel. May v. Seneca-Cayuga Tribe, 711 P.2d 77, 86 (Okla. 1985).
153. Id. at 88.
154. Id.
155. Id (quoting Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes ofthe Yakima Indian Nation,
439 U.S. 463, 493 (1979)).
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analysis to determine the proper applicable law when the plaintiffs injury
occurs in a separate jurisdiction from that of the alleged breach."s'
Under Oklahoma law, "the rights and liabilities of parties with respect to a
particular issue in tort shall be determined by the local law of the state which,
with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the
occurrence and the parties."'17 Therefore, Oklahoma may not be able to assert
state dram-shop law against the tribe if it can be found that the tribe has a more
significant relationship to the occurrence in question. In assessing which
jurisdiction has the "most significant relationship" to the occurrence,
Oklahoma has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. 58 The
Restatement lists four factors to be considered in making such an inquiry. The
factors that are to be considered and evaluated are (1) the place where the
injury occurred; (2) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred;
(3) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of
business of the parties; and (4) the place where the relationship, if any,
Oklahoma further recognizes that none of the
between the parties arose.'
choice-of-law factors are controlling, but that the factors must be evaluated
according to the type of case involved.'
Consequently, in the case of Bittle, it is uncertain whether the Absentee
Shawnee Tribe or the State of Oklahoma has the more significant relationship
to the occurrence and the parties. First, the site where the injury occurred, an
Oklahoma highway, balances equally against the place where the alleged
conduct giving rise to the accident (the excessive serving of alcohol) occurred:
the casino in Indian Country. Also, the domicile or residence of the plaintiff,
Oklahoma, counterbalances with the location of the defendants' business,
Absentee Shawnee tribal land. The factors concerning the place where the
relationship between the parties arose is irrelevant because no relationship
existed prior to the accident. Thus, after close consideration of these factors,
neither the Tribe nor the State seems to have the greater interest.

156. See, e.g., Bankord v. DeRock, 423 F. Supp. 602,606 (N.D. Iowa 1976) (applying Iowa
law when alcohol served in Iowa resulted in injury to Minnesota resident in Minnesota);
Dunaway v. Fellous, 842 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that, where drinking
occurred in Missouri and accident occurred in Illinois, Missouri law applied); Thoring v.
Bottonsek, 350 N.W.2d 586, 591 (N.D. 1984) (holding that North Dakota law had no effect
when alcohol was sold in Montana but accident occurred in North Dakota).
157. Brickner v. Gooden, 525 P.2d 632, 637 (Okla. 1974).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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The deciding factors in this case are the relevant policies and interests of the
Tribe and the State. The importance of the tribal legal system to tribal
sovereignty is well-recognized by the Supreme Court and Congress."' "As
separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution, tribes have historically been
regarded as unconstrained by those constitutional provisions framed
specifically as limitations on federal or state authority."' 62 Thus, any state law
attempting to question this sovereignty would inherently infringe upon it. The
federal policy of promoting economic growth and the protection and
promotion of tribal self-government could therefore require that the Oklahoma
law not be applied.
Yet the state's interests in preserving its own laws and protecting the
citizens of Oklahoma are not to be overlooked. Oklahoma has a real interest
in ensuring that the laws applied inside its borders do not contravene its public
policies. Furthermore, Oklahoma's interests would be severely impaired if its
public policy were subordinated to that of a tribe. Oklahoma citizens could
then no longer rely on the protections provided to them by the State simply
because a patron became intoxicated on Indian lands rather than off of them.
Certainty, predictability, and uniformity point neither to state nor tribal law.
It remains possible, however, that Oklahoma dram-shop law may not be
applied extraterritorially.
Moreover, in cases where ambiguity exists between federal and tribal
courts, courts may adhere to the Indian Abstention Doctrine.' The Indian
Abstention Doctrine deals with concurrent jurisdiction between tribal and
federal courts.'" The doctrine recognizes that, although jurisdiction may be
concurrent, a federal court must abstain from assuming jurisdiction over
disputes involving reservation affairs until parties have exhausted all available
tribal-court remedies.' This means that a party must pursue its action in tribal
court before a federal court will assume jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has
listed three reasons to support this policy, acknowledging that exhaustion
would (1) promote the congressional policy of strengthening tribal selfgovernance; (2) serve the orderly administration ofjustice; and (3) provide the

161.
162.
163.
(1987);

White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143-44 (1980).
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978).
COHEN, supra note 1, at 630 (citing Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9
Nat'1 Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985)).

164. Id.
165. Nat'1Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 856-57.
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parties and the federal court involved with the benefit of the tribal court's
expertise."'
Because the Indian Abstention Doctrine was originally created to resolve
jurisdictional disputes between federal and tribal governments, it presently
remains unclear whether the doctrine also applies to conflicts between state
and tribal courts. Some state courts have applied the doctrine,"' while other
states have refused to apply it or have simply ignored it."' Certainly, the
Supreme Court has provided some support for the exhaustion of tribal
remedies when it comes to state courts. In Iowa Mutual, the Supreme Court
indicated that exhaustion would apply to both state and federal courts when it
used the phrase "any nontribal court."' 9 Yet the Supreme Court has not
provided any clear ruling on the matter. Therefore, it seems that a state court
may apply the Indian Abstention Doctrine at its discretion.
It is thus recommended that, if the substantive law of the tribe is favored
after conducting a choice-of-law analysis, state courts should dismiss the
action in order to permit tribal courts to decide the matter. If the state's
choice-of-law system points to the use of the forum state's law, however, the
state court may accept jurisdiction. Finally, if the state's choice-of-law system
results in ambiguities as to whether state or tribal law should be applied, the
state should abstain and defer to the tribe. This follows the general
government policy that ambiguities should be interpreted in favor of the tribe
and that tribal self-government should be encouraged.
This system is not without problems. For example, the Absentee Shawnee
Tribe currently does not recognize any form of dram-shop action. This poses
a major problem. How does a state court defer to tribal law when no law
exists? In such cases, some courts have previously found that where there is
an absence of tribal law addressing the particular subject matter of a case, then
the tribal court fails to exercise its sovereignty.o In such instances any tribal
policies pressing for the use of tribal law and abstention are no longer valid.
For example, the Tenth Circuit in Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe &
Shoshone Tribes permitted suit in federal court when tribal remedies were

166. Id.
167. See, e.g., Klammer v. Lower Sioux Convenience Store, 535 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1995); In re Marriage of Limpy, 636 P.2d 266 (Mont. 1981).
168. See, e.g., Wacondo v. Concha, 873 P.2d 276 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).
169. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987).
170. See, e.g., Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe & Shoshone Tribes, 623 F.2d 682, 685
(10th Cir. 1980) ("There has to be a forum where the dispute can be settled.").
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unavailable."' But although these arguments certainly have some validity,
they contradict the very principles of the Indian Abstention Doctrine. The
Indian Abstention Doctrine mandates that federal courts defer to tribal courts
so they may determine their law and jurisdiction. Government policy presses
for better courts within tribal governments. Yet if states fail to defer in cases
of first impression, how then are tribal courts supposed to evolve? In cases of
first impression, and when choice-of-law is unclear, it is suggested that state
courts abstain, thus allowing tribes to determine the bounds of their own
jurisdiction and law.
VII. Conclusion
Some legal scholars believe that public policy demands a widespread
reconsideration of the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. Many in fact
agree with the Oklahoma Supreme Court, claiming that such immunity
improperly and unfairly conditions a plaintiffs ability to recover damages
under otherwise-tortious circumstances. Yet these scholars, like the Oklahoma
Supreme Court, rightfully remain in the minority.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court's ruling in Bittle effectively separates
Oklahoma from the majority of state and federal case law that undeniably
recognizes inherent tribal immunity. Courts across the country have deflated
this immunity only reluctantly.
Furthermore, modern and historical
jurisprudence mandate that immunity be stripped only in the presence of clear
federal legislation or an explicit waiver of tribal immunity. Yet the Oklahoma
Supreme Court seemingly throws the legal precedents of the masses to the
wind for the interest of one.
Fortunately, it is unlikely that the Bittle ruling will be expanded to
encompass greater infringements on tribal sovereign immunity. Given the
unusual scope of dram-shop liability, the ruling draws a bright line with
respect to the specific tort in question and thus should not be extended. If
attempted, however, the expansion would only inflate the present legal tragedy
and mirage ofjustice found in the Bittle decision.

17 1. Id.
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